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Optimization
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and Stefan Werner, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—We develop a privacy-preserving distributed algo-
rithm to minimize a regularized empirical risk function when
the first-order information is not available and data is distributed
over a multi-agent network. We employ a zeroth-order method
to minimize the associated augmented Lagrangian function in
the primal domain using the alternating direction method of
multipliers (ADMM). We show that the proposed algorithm,
named distributed zeroth-order ADMM (D-ZOA), has intrin-
sic privacy-preserving properties. Unlike the existing privacy-
preserving methods based on the ADMM where the primal or the
dual variables are perturbed with noise, the inherent randomness
due to the use of a zeroth-order method endows D-ZOA with
intrinsic differential privacy. By analyzing the perturbation of
the primal variable, we show that the privacy leakage of the
proposed D-ZOA algorithm is bounded. In addition, we employ
the moments accountant method to show that the total privacy
leakage grows sublinearly with the number of ADMM iterations.
D-ZOA outperforms the existing differentially private approaches
in terms of accuracy while yielding the same privacy guarantee.
We prove that D-ZOA converges to the optimal solution at a rate
of O(1/M) where M is the number of ADMM iterations. The
convergence analysis also reveals a practically important trade-
off between privacy and accuracy. Simulation results verify the
desirable privacy-preserving properties of D-ZOA and its superi-
ority over a state-of-the-art algorithm as well as its network-wide
convergence to the optimal solution.
Index Terms—Alternating direction method of multipliers,
differential privacy, distributed optimization, zeroth-order op-
timization methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the recent advances in technology, large amountsof data are gathered by numerous sensors scattered
over large geographical areas. Performing learning tasks at a
central processing hub in a large distributed network can be
prohibitive due to computation/communication costs. Collect-
ing all data at a central hub may also create a single point
of failure. Therefore, it is important to develop algorithms
that are capable of processing the data gathered by agents
dispersed over a distributed network [2]–[10]. In this context,
each agent has access only to the information of its local
objective function while the agents aim to collaboratively
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optimize the aggregate of the local objective functions. Such
distributed solutions are highly demanded in many of today’s
optimization problems pertaining to statistics [2]–[4], signal
processing [5]–[7], and control [8]–[10].
However, the communications between neighboring agents
may lead to privacy violation issues. An adversary may
infer sensitive data of one or more agents by sniffing the
communicated information. The adversary can be either a
curious member of the network or an eavesdropper. Therefore,
it is important to develop privacy-preserving methods that
allow distributed processing of data without revealing private
information. Differential privacy provides privacy protection
against adversarial attacks by ensuring minimal change in the
outcome of the algorithm regardless of whether or not a single
agent’s data is taken into account.
Moreover, in some real-world problems, obtaining first-
order information is hard due to non-smooth objectives [2],
[8], [9] or lack of any complete objective function. For
example, in bandit optimization [11], an adversary generates
a sequence of loss functions and the goal is to minimize such
sequence that is only available at some agents. In addition, in
simulation-based optimization, the objective is available only
using repeated simulations [12] while, in adversarial black-box
machine learning models, only the function values are given
[13]. This motivates the use of zeroth-order methods, which
only use the values of the objective functions to approximate
their gradients.
A. Related Work
There have been several works developing privacy-
preserving algorithms for distributed convex optimization
[14]–[21]. The work in [14] proposes two differentially private
distributed algorithms that are based on the alternating direc-
tion method of multipliers (ADMM). The algorithms in [14]
are obtained by perturbing the dual and the primal variable, re-
spectively. However, in both algorithms, the privacy leakage of
an agent is bounded only at a single iteration and an adversary
might exploit knowledge available from all iterations to infer
sensitive information. This shortcoming is mitigated in [15]–
[18]. The works in [15], [16] develop ADMM-based differen-
tially private algorithms with improved accuracy. The work in
[17] employs the ADMM to develop a distributed algorithm
where the primal variable is perturbed by adding a Gaussian
noise with diminishing variance to ensure zero-concentrated
differential privacy enabling higher accuracy compared to the
common (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. The work in [18] develops
2a stochastic ADMM-based distributed algorithm that further
enhances the accuracy while ensuring differential privacy. The
authors of [19]–[21] propose differentially-private distributed
algorithms that utilize the projected-gradient-descent method
for handling constraints. The differentially private distributed
algorithm proposed in [22] is based on perturbing the local
objective functions.
All the above-mentioned algorithms offer distributed so-
lutions only for problems with smooth objective functions.
The work in [23] addresses problems with non-smooth ob-
jective functions by employing a first-order approximation of
the augmented Lagrangian with a scalar l2-norm proximity
operator. However, this algorithm is not fully distributed since
it requires a central coordinator to average all the perturbed
primal variable updates over the network at every iteration.
Most existing algorithms require some modifications
through deliberately perturbing either the local estimates or
the objective functions. This compromises the performance of
the algorithm by degrading its accuracy especially when large
amount of noise is required to provide high privacy levels. The
work in [24] considers privacy-preserving properties that are
intrinsic, i.e., they do not require any change in the algorithm
but are associated with the algorithm’s inherent properties.
However, the approach taken in [24] considers a privacy metric
based on the topology of the communication graph.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we develop a fully-distributed differentially-
private algorithm to solve a class of regularized empirical risk
minimization (ERM) problems when first-order information
is unavailable or hard to obtain. We utilize the ADMM for
distributed optimization and a zeroth-order method, called the
two-point stochastic gradient algorithm [25], to minimize the
augmented Lagrangian function in the ADMM’s primal update
step. The proposed algorithm, called distributed zeroth-order
ADMM (D-ZOA), is fully distributed in the sense that each
agent of the network communicates only with its immediate
neighbors and no central coordination is necessary. It also only
requires the objective function values to solve the underlying
ERM problem while respecting privacy.
The privacy-preserving properties of the proposed D-ZOA
algorithm are intrinsic. To prove this, we model the primal
variable at each agent as the sum of an exact (unperturbed)
value and a random perturbation. This enables us to ap-
proximate the distribution of the primal variable and verify
that the stochasticity inherent to the employed zeroth-order
method makes D-ZOA differential private. To this end, we
prove that the privacy leakage of a single iteration of D-ZOA
at each agent is bounded. Utilizing the moments accountant
method [26], we also show that the total privacy leakage over
all iterations grows sublinearly with the number of ADMM
iterations. This is particularly significant as we observe that
the optimization accuracy of D-ZOA is higher compared to
the existing privacy-preserving approaches, which perturb the
variables exchanged among the network agents by adding
noise.
We prove that the convergence rate of D-ZOA is O(1/M)
whereM is the number of iterations of the ADMM outer loop.
The convergence rate of the inner loop is O(√P/T ) where P
is the number of features and T is the number of iterations of
the inner loop. More importantly, no communication among
agents is required throughout the inner loop. The convergence
analysis also reveals an explicit privacy-accuracy trade-off
where a stronger privacy guarantee corresponds to a lower
accuracy.
Simulation results demonstrate that, with any given level of
required privacy guarantee, D-ZOA outperforms an existing
ADMM-based related algorithm (DP-ADMM) presented in
[23]. This algorithm has been developed for distributed opti-
mization of non-smooth objective functions and achieves dif-
ferential privacy by adding noise to the primal variables [23].
C. Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the system model and formulate the distributed
ERM problem when first-order information is not available. In
Section III, we describe our proposed D-ZOA algorithm and
explain the privacy issues associated with distributed learning.
In Section IV, we present the intrinsic privacy-preserving
properties of the proposed D-ZOA algorithm by showing
that the privacy leakage of each agent at any iteration is
bounded and the total privacy leakage grows sublinearly with
the number of ADMM iterations. In Section V, we prove the
convergence of D-ZOA by confirming that both inner and outer
loops of the algorithm converge. We provide some simulation
results in Section VI and draw conclusions in Section VII.
D. Mathematical notations
The set of natural and real numbers are denoted by N and
R, respectively. The set of positive real numbers is denoted
by R+. Scalars, column vectors, and matrices are respectively
denoted by lowercase, bold lowercase, and bold uppercase
letters. The operators (·)T, det(·), and tr(·) denote transpose,
determinant, and trace of a matrix, respectively. ‖·‖ represents
the Euclidean norm of its vector argument. In is an identity
matrix of size n, 0n is an n × 1 vector with all zeros
entries, 0n×p = 0n0
T
p , and | · | denotes the cardinality if its
argument is a set. The statistical expectation and covariance
operators are represented by E[·] and cov[·], respectively. The
notation N (µ,Σ) denotes normal distribution with mean µ
and covariance matrix Σ. For a positive semidefinite matrix
X, λmin(X) and λmax(X) denote the nonzero smallest and
largest eigenvalues of X, respectively. For a vector x ∈ Rn
and a matrix A, ‖x‖2
A
denotes the quadratic form xTAx.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a network withK ∈ N agents and E ∈ N edges
modeled as an undirected graph G(K, E) where the vertex set
K = {1, . . . ,K} corresponds to the agents and the set E
represents the bidirectional communication links between the
pairs of neighboring agents. Agent k ∈ K can communicate
only with the agents in its neighborhood Nk. By convention,
the set Nk includes the agent k as well.
3Each agent k ∈ K has a private dataset
Dk = {(Xk,yk) : Xk = [xk,1,xk,2, . . . ,xk,Nk ]T ∈ RNk×P ,
yk = [yk,1, yk,2, . . . , yk,Nk ]
T ∈ RNk}
where Nk is the number of data samples collected at the agent
k and P is the number of features in each sample.
We consider the problem of estimating a parameter of
interest β ∈ RP that relates the value of an output measure-
ment stored in the response vector yk to input measurements
collected in the corresponding row of the local matrix Xk.
The associated supervised learning problem can be cast as a
regularized ERM expressed by
min
β
K∑
k=1
1
Nk
Nk∑
j=1
ℓ(xk,j , yk,j ;β) + ηR(β) (1)
where ℓ : RP → R is the loss function, R : RP → R is the
regularizer function, and η > 0 is the regularization parameter.
The ERM problem pertains to several applications in machine
learning, e.g., linear regression [2], support vector machine
[27], and logistic regression [17], [23]. We assume that the
loss function ℓ(·) and the regularizer function R(·) are both
convex but at least one of them is non-smooth. Let us denote
the optimal solution of (1) by βc.
III. NON-SMOOTH DISTRIBUTED LEARNING
We first discuss the consensus-based reformulation of the
problem that allows its distributed solution through an iterative
process consisting of two nested loops. Then, we describe the
ADMM procedure that forms the outer loop and the zeroth-
order two-point stochastic gradient algorithm that constitutes
the inner loop solving the ADMM primal update step. Finally,
we discuss the related privacy matters.
A. Consensus-Based Reformulation
To solve (1) in a distributed manner, we reformulate it as
the following constrained minimization problem
min
{β
k
}
K∑
k=1
( 1
Nk
Nk∑
j=1
ℓ(xk,j , yk,j ;βk) +
η
K
R(βk)
)
s.t. βk = βl, l ∈ Nk, ∀k ∈ K
(2)
where V = {βk}Kk=1 are the primal variables representing
local copies of β at the agents. The equality constraints impose
consensus across each agent’s neighborhood Nk. To solve (2)
collaboratively and in a fully-distributed manner, we utilize
the ADMM [7]. For this purpose, we rewrite (2) as
min
{β
k
}
K∑
k=1
( 1
Nk
Nk∑
j=1
ℓ(xk,j , yk,j ;βk) +
η
K
R(βk)
)
s.t. βk = z
l
k, βl = z
l
k, l ∈ Nk, ∀k ∈ K
(3)
where Z = {zlk}k∈K,l∈Nk are the auxiliary variables yielding
an alternative but equivalent representation of the constraints
in (2). They help decouple βk in the constraints and facilitate
the derivation of the local recursions before being eventually
eliminated.
To apply the ADMM, we rewrite (3) in the matrix form.
By defining w ∈ RKP concatenating all βk and z ∈ R2EP
concatenating all zlk, (3) can be written as
min
w,z
f(w)
s.t. Aw +Bz = 0
(4)
where
f(w) =
K∑
k=1
fk(βk),
fk(βk) =
1
Nk
Nk∑
j=1
ℓ(xk,j , yk,j ;βk) +
η
K
R(βk),
A = [AT1 ,A
T
2 ]
T, andA1,A2 ∈ R2EP×KP are both composed
of 2E × K blocks of P × P matrices. If (k, l) ∈ E and zlk
is the qth block of z, then the (q, k)th block of A1 and the
(q, l)th block of A2 are the identity matrix IP . Otherwise, the
corresponding blocks are 0P×P . Furthermore, we have
B = [−I2EP ,−I2EP ]T.
To facilitate the representation, we also define the following
matrices
M+ = A
T
1 +A
T
2
M− = A
T
1 −AT2
L+ = 0.5M+M
T
+
L− = 0.5M−M
T
−
H = 0.5(L+ + L−)
Q =
√
0.5L−.
Solving (4) via the ADMM requires a procedure that is
described in the next subsection.
B. Distributed ADMM Algorithm
To solve the minimization problem (4) in a distributed man-
ner, we employ the ADMM [28]. The augmented Lagrangian
function associated with (4) is given by
Lρ(w, z,λ) = f(w)+λT(Aw+Bz)+ ρ
2
‖Aw +Bz‖2 (5)
where λ ∈ R4EP is the Lagrange multiplier and ρ > 0 is a
penalty parameter.
The ADMM entails an iterative procedure consisting of
three steps at each iteration m as
w(m) = argmin
w
Lρ(w, z(m−1),λ(m−1))
z(m) = argmin
z
Lρ(w(m), z,λ(m−1))
λ(m) = λ(m−1) + ρ[Aw(m) +Bz(m)].
(6)
In [28], it is shown that, considering λ = [λT1 ,λ
T
2 ]
T with
λ1,λ2 ∈ R2EP and γ =M−λ1, the ADMM algorithm steps
in (6) reduce to
w(m) = argmin
w
F(w,w(m−1),γ(m−1)) (7)
γ(m) = γ(m−1) + ρL−w
(m) (8)
4where
F(w,w(m−1),γ(m−1)) = f(w) +wTγ(m−1)
+ ρwTHw− ρwTL+w(m−1)
and the initial values of w and γ are set to zero. Note that the
update equations (7) and (8) are distributed among the agents
asw = [βT1 ,β
T
2 , . . . ,β
T
K ]
T and γ = [γT1 ,γ
T
2 , . . . ,γ
T
K ]
T where
γk = 2
∑
l∈Nk
γlk
is the local Lagrange multiplier at agent k associated with the
constraints in (3) [7].
Since the objective function in (7) is assumed to be non-
smooth, it cannot be solved using any first-order method. To
overcome this, we use a zeroth-order method described in the
next subsection.
C. Zeroth-Order Method
To solve (7) employing a zeroth-order method, we make the
following assumptions that are common in the zeroth-order
optimization literature, see, e.g., [8], [25], [29].
Assumption 1: The function F(·) is closed.
Assumption 2: The function F(·) is Lipschitz-continuous
with the Lipschitz constant L.
In zeroth-order optimization, F(·) is also required to be
convex [8], [25], [29]. However,F(·) is the sum of f(·), which
are assumed to be convex, the linear terms wTγ(m−1) and
−ρwTL+w(m−1), and the quadratic term ρwTHw, which is
convex since H is positive semi-definite for being the sum
of the positive semi-definite matrices L+ and L−. Therefore,
F(·) is convex as it is the sum of convex functions [30].
We utilize the two-point stochastic-gradient algorithm that
has been proposed in [25] for optimizing general non-smooth
functions. More specifically, we use the stochastic mirror
descent method with the proximal function 12 ‖·‖ and the
gradient estimator at point w given by
Γ(w,γ(m−1), u1, u2,ν1,ν2) = u
−1
2 [F(w + u1ν1
+ u2ν2,γ
(m−1))−F(w + u1ν1,γ(m−1))]ν2 (9)
where u1 > 0 and u2 > 0 are smoothing constants and ν1,
ν2 are independent zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with
the covariance matrix IKP , i.e., ν1,ν2 ∼ N (0KP , IKP ).
The two-point stochastic-gradient algorithm consists of two
randomization steps where the second step is aimed at pre-
venting the perturbation vector ν2 from being close to a point
of non-smoothness [25]. This algorithm entails an iterative
procedure that consists of three steps at each iteration t. First,
J ∈ N independent random vectors {νj1,t}Jj=1 and {νj2,t}Jj=1
are sampled fromN (0KP , IKP ). Second, a stochastic gradient
g(t) is calculated as
g(t) =
1
J
J∑
j=1
g
(t)
j (10)
where
g
(t)
j = Γ(w
(t),γ(m−1), u1,t, u2,t,ν
j
1,t,ν
j
2,t),
Algorithm 1 Distributed Zeroth-Order ADMM (D-ZOA)
At all agents k ∈ K, initialize β(0)k = 0, γ(0)k = 0, and
locally run
for m = 1, 2, . . . ,M do
Share β
(m−1)
k with neighbors in Nk
Update γ
(m)
k as in (20)
Initialize β
(0)
k = 0
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
Draw independent {νj,k1,t}Jj=1, {νj,k2,t}Jj=1 ∼ N (0P , IP )
Set u1,t = u1/t, u2,t = u1/(Pt)
2
Compute g
(t)
k as in (12) and (9)
Update β
(t)
k = β
(t−1)
k − αtg(t)k
end for
Update β
(m)
k = β
(T )
k
end for
w(t) is the tth iterate of the two-point stochastic-gradient
algorithm with the initial value w(0) = 0 and {u1,t}∞t=1
and {u2,t}∞t=1 are two non-increasing sequences of positive
parameters such that u2,t ≤ u1,t/2. Finally, w(t) is updated
as
w(t) = w(t−1) − αtg(t) (11)
where αt is a time-varying step-size. The step-size is computed
as
αt =
(
L
√
tP log(2P )
)−1
α0R
where α0 is an appropriate initial step-size and R is an upper
bound on the distance between a minimizer w∗ to (7) and the
first iterate w(1) as per [25].
Locally at agent k, the appropriate subvectors {νj,k1,t}Jj=1
and {νj,k2,t}Jj=1 of, respectively, {νj1,t}Jj=1 and {νj2,t}Jj=1 are
utilized. These subvectors are also independent of each other
and have independent entries. Subsequently, a k-local stochas-
tic gradient g
(t)
k is computed as
g
(t)
k =
1
J
J∑
j=1
g
(t)
j,k (12)
where
g
(t)
j,k = Γ(β
(t)
k ,γ
(m−1)
k , u1,t, u2,t,ν
j,k
1,t ,ν
j,k
2,t ).
Hence, β
(t)
k is updated as
β
(t)
k = β
(t−1)
k − αtg(t)k . (13)
We use multiple independent random samples {νj1,t}Jj=1 and
{νj2,t}Jj=1 to obtain a more accurate estimate of the gradient
g(t) as remarked in [25].
Furthermore, no communication among agents is needed
in the inner loop. The update equations in (11) and (13)
can be implemented in a fully-distributed fashion since they
involve only the variables available within every agent’s neigh-
borhood. The proposed algorithm, D-ZOA, is summarized in
Algorithm 1.
5D. Privacy
In Algorithm 1, the data stored at each agent, Xk and yk, is
not shared with any other agent. However, the local estimates
{β(m)k }k∈K are exchanged within the local neighborhoods.
Therefore, the risk of privacy breach still exists as it has been
shown by model inversion attacks [31]. We assume that the
adversary cannot access the local data, but is able to access the
exchanged local estimates {β(m)k }k∈K. The adversary can be
either a member of the network or an external eavesdropper.
We show that D-ZOA guarantees (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy as
per below definition since it is intrinsically resistant to such
inference attacks.
Definition 1. A randomized algorithm M is (ǫ, δ)-
differentially private if for any two neighboring datasets D
and D′ differing in only one data sample and for any subset
of outputs O ⊆ range(M), we have
Pr[M(D) ∈ O] ≤ eǫPr[M(D′) ∈ O] + δ. (14)
This means the ratio of the probability distributions ofM(D)
and M(D′) is bounded by eǫ.
In Definition 1, ǫ and δ are privacy parameters indicating
the level of privacy preservation ensured by a differentially
private algorithm. A better privacy preservation is achieved
with smaller ǫ or δ. On the other hand, low privacy guarantee
corresponds to higher values of ǫ, i.e., close to 1. Therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that ǫ ∈ (0, 1] as in [17], [32].
IV. INTRINSIC DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY GUARANTEE
Employing the zeroth-order method for the ADMM primal
update produces a perturbed (inexact) estimate. Therefore, the
solution in the primal update step in (7) using D-ZOA can be
modeled as
w(m) = w˘(m) + ξ(m) (15)
where w˘(m) ∈ RP is the exact ADMM primal update and
ξ(m) ∈ RP is a random variable representing the perturbation.
The oracle w˘(m) satisfies the equation
∇f(w˘(m)) + γ(m−1) + 2ρHw˘(m) = ρL+w(m−1) (16)
where ∇f is the hypothetical exact gradient of f . Equation
(16) is obtained by computing ∇F(w˘,w(m−1),γ(m−1)) and
equating it to zero [33, pg. 741]. The model (15) represents
an implicit primal variable perturbation that can be contrasted
with the explicit primal variable perturbation used in [14], [17].
Using (15), the primal and dual update equations in (16)
and (8) can be expressed as
w˘(m) = − 1
2ρ
H−1∇f(w˘(m))− 1
2ρ
H−1γ(m−1)
+
1
2
H−1L+w
(m−1)
w(m) = w˘(m) + ξ(m)
γ(m) = γ(m−1) + ρL−w
(m).
(17)
Note that (15) also applies to all agents as
w˘(m) =
[
β˘
(m)T
1 , β˘
(m)T
2 , . . . , β˘
(m)T
K
]T
ξ(m) =
[
ξ
(m)T
1 , ξ
(m)T
2 , . . . , ξ
(m)T
K
]T
where β˘k is the local exact primal update at agent k and
ξk is the local perturbation of β˘k at agent k. Recalling the
definitions of H, L+, and L−, the update equations in (17)
entail the following local update equations at the kth agent:
β˘
(m)
k =−
1
2ρ|Nk|∇fk
(
β˘
(m)
k
)
+
1
2|Nk|
(
|Nk|β(m−1)k
+
∑
l∈Nk
β
(m−1)
l
)
− 1
2ρ|Nk|γ
(m−1)
k (18)
β
(m)
k = β˘
(m)
k + ξ
(m)
k (19)
γ
(m)
k = γ
(m−1)
k + ρ
∑
l∈Nk
(
β
(m)
k − β(m)l
)
. (20)
To prove that D-ZOA is differentially private, we require
the probability distribution of the primal variable β
(m)
k . In the
next subsection, we find an approximate distribution of the
primal variable.
A. Primal Variable Distribution
To approximate its pdf, in view of (13) and the fact that
β
(0)
k = 0, we unfold β
(m)
k as
β
(m)
k = −
T∑
t=1
αtg
(t)
k .
The stochastic gradient g
(t)
k is the average of J independent
random samples g
(t)
j,k that are functions of the random values
{νj1,t}Jj=1 and {νj2,t}Jj=1 drawn from the same distribution.
Therefore, it is realistic to assume that {g(t)j,k}Jj=1 are indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with a common mean
µ
(t)
k and a finite covariance matrix Ψ
(t)
k . Thus, the probability
distribution of β
(m)
k is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If {g(t)j,k}Jj=1 are i.i.d. and J is sufficiently large,
then β
(m)
k is distributed as
β
(m)
k ∼ N
(
β˘
(m)
k ,
1
J
T∑
t=1
α2tΨ
(t)
k
)
. (21)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Since we are interested in exploring the privacy properties
of the proposed D-ZOA and, thereby, the best privacy
guarantee that it offers, we consider a conservative upper-
bound for the covariance matrices Ψ
(t)
k . This is motivated
by the direct connection between the algorithmic privacy
guarantee and the extent of the randomness involved in the
algorithm where a higher variance corresponds to a higher
privacy guarantee. Such a relationship between variance and
privacy is also shown in the existing works on differential
privacy, see, e.g., [17], [23].
6To make the problem more tractable, we assume that the
entries of the random vector β
(m)
k are independent of each
other and have the same variance [14], [23], [32]. Let us denote
the variance of every entry of ξ
(m)
k by σ
2
k. Therefore, in view
of Lemma 1, we have
σ2k =
1
JP
T∑
t=1
α2t tr
(
Ψ
(t)
k
)
,
which is in turn upper-bounded as per the following lemma.
Lemma 2. There exists a constant c such that
1
JP
T∑
t=1
α2t tr
(
Ψ
(t)
k
)
≤ cα
2
0R
2
JP log(2P )
(
s1(1 + log(P )) + s2
)
− 4 ‖β
c‖2
TJP
.
(22)
where s1 =
∑T
t=1 t
−1, s2 =
∑T
t=1 t
−1.5, and βc is the
optimal solution.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In [25], it is shown that c = 0.5 is suitable when ν1 and
ν2 are sampled from a multivariate normal distribution.
B. l2-Norm Sensitivity
In this subsection, we estimate the l2-norm sensitivity of
β˘
(m)
k . The l2 norm sensitivity calibrates the magnitude of
the noise by which β˘
(m)
k has to be perturbed to preserve
privacy. Unlike the existing privacy-preserving methods where
the noise is added to the output of the algorithm [14], [17],
[23], [32], [34], [35], in D-ZOA, the noise is inherent.
In addition to Assumptions 1 and 2, we introduce the
following assumption that is widely used in the literature, see,
e.g., [14], [23], [32].
Assumption 3: There exists a constant c1 such that
‖∇ℓ(·)‖ ≤ c1 where ℓ(·) is the loss function defined in
Section II.
Similar to the classical methods of differential privacy
analysis, e.g., [23], [32], we first define the l2 norm sensitivity.
Subsequently, we estimate the l2-norm sensitivity of β
(m)
k .
Definition 2. The l2-norm sensitivity of β˘
(m)
k is defined as
∆k,2 = max
Dk,D′k
∥∥∥β˘(m)k,Dk − β˘(m)k,D′k
∥∥∥ (23)
where β˘
(m)
k,Dk
and β˘
(m)
k,D′
k
denote the local primal variables for
two neighboring datasets Dk and D′k differing in only one data
sample, i.e., one row ofXk and the corresponding entry of yk.
The l2-norm sensitivity of β˘
(m)
k is an upper bound on∥∥∥β˘(m)k,Dk − β˘(m)k,D′k
∥∥∥ and is computed as in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 3, the l2-norm sensitivity of
β˘
(m)
k is given by
∆k,2 =
c1
ρ|Nk|Nk . (24)
Proof. See Appendix C.
In the next subsection, we present our main result proving
that the proposed D-ZOA algorithm is differentially private.
C. Intrinsic (ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy Guarantee
In this section, we prove that, at each iteration of Algorithm
1, (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy is guaranteed.
Theorem 1. Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1] and
σk =
c1
√
2.1 log(1.25/δ)
ρ|Nk|Nkǫ . (25)
Under Assumption 3, at each iteration of D-ZOA, (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy is guaranteed. Specifically, for any neigh-
boring datasetsDk andD′k and any output β(m)k , the following
inequality holds:
Pr[β
(m)
k,Dk
] ≤ eǫPr[β(m)
k,D′
k
] + δ. (26)
Proof. See Appendix D.
Theorem 1 also shows that the variance of the inherent
noise is inversely proportional to the privacy parameter ǫ.
This implies that a higher variance leads to a smaller ǫ and
higher privacy guarantee. In fact, a smaller ǫ implies that
the ratio of the probability distributions of β
(m)
k,Dk
and β
(m)
k,D′
k
is smaller, which means less information is available to a
sniffing/spoofing adversary through βk hence the improved
privacy [14].
The following corollary shows the connection between the
privacy parameter ǫ and the number of samples J in the most
private case of the variance σk approaching its upper bound.
Corollary 1. If {g(t)j,k}Jj=1 are i.i.d., J is sufficiently large, and
Assumption 3 holds, we have
ǫ =
c1
ρ|Nk|Nk
√
2.1JP log(1.25/δ)
×
(
cR2α20
log(2P )
(s1(1 + log(P )) + s2)− 4 ‖β
c‖2
T
)− 1
2
.
(27)
Proof. The proof follows from equating the expression for
σk in Theorem 1, (25), and the expression for the trace of
the covariance of β
(m)
k in Lemma 1 where the trace of Ψ
(t)
k
has been replaced by the upper-bound derived in Lemma 2.
Solving the resultant equation for ǫ yields (27).
Corollary 1 provides the highest possible level of privacy
guarantee that can be ensured by D-ZOA due to its inherent
randomness brought about by using a zeroth-order method in
the inner loop.
D. Total Privacy Leakage
In this subsection, we consider the total privacy leakage of
the proposed D-ZOA algorithm. Since D-ZOA is an M -fold
adaptive algorithm, we utilize the results of [26] together with
the moments accountant method to evaluate its total privacy
leakage. The main result is summarized in the following
theorem.
7Theorem 2. Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1] and
σk =
c1
√
2.1 log(1.25/δ)
ρ|Nk|Nkǫ . (28)
Under Assumption 3, Algorithm 1 guarantees (ǫ¯, δ)-differential
privacy where
ǫ¯ = ǫ
√
M log(1/δ)
1.05 log(1.25/δ)
. (29)
Proof. The proof is obtained by using the log moments of the
privacy loss and their linear composability in the same way as
in [23, Theorem 2].
V. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
The convergence of D-ZOA to the centralized solution is
established by corroborating that both inner and outer loops
of the algorithm converge. The convergence of the inner loop
can be verified following [25, Theorem 2], i.e., it can be shown
that, under Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a constant c such
that, for each T representing a fixed number of inner-loop
iterations, the following inequality holds:
E[F(wˆ(T ))−F(w∗)]
≤cRL
√
P√
T
(
max{α0, α−10 }
√
log(2P ) +
u1 log(2T )√
T
) (30)
where
wˆ(T ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
w(t).
In [25], it is shown that c = 0.5 is suitable when ν1 and ν2
are sampled from a normal distribution. The convergence of
the outer loop can be proven by verifying the convergence of
a fully distributed ADMM with inexact primal updates.
To present the convergence result, we construct the auxiliary
sequence
r(m) =
m∑
s=0
Qw(s)
and define the auxiliary vector q(m) and the auxiliary matrix
G as
q(m) =
[
r(m)
w(m)
]
, G =
[
ρIP 0P×P
0P×P ρ
L+
2
]
. (31)
The convergence results of [36], [17], and [37] can now be
adapted to D-ZOA as per the following theorem that also
provides an explicit privacy-accuracy trade-off.
Theorem 3. If f(·) is convex, {g(t)j,k}Jj=1 are i.i.d., J is
sufficiently large, and Assumption 3 holds, for any M > 0,
we have
E[f(wˆ(M))− f(w∗)]
≤
∥∥q(0) − q∥∥2
G
M
+
2.1c21Pρ log(1.25/δ)λ
2
max(L+)
2ρ2|Nk|2N2k ǫ2λmin(L−)
(32)
where q = [rT, (w∗)T]T and
wˆ(M) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
w˘(m).
Fig. 1. Topology of the considered multi-agent network.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Theorem 3 reveals a privacy-accuracy trade-off offered by
D-ZOA. When the privacy guarantee is stronger (smaller ǫ and
δ), the accuracy is lower. It also shows that D-ZOA converges
at a rate of O(1/M) where M is the number of iterations of
the ADMM outer loop.
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present some simulated examples to
evaluate the performance and the privacy-accuracy trade-off
of the proposed D-ZOA algorithm. We benchmark the perfor-
mance and the privacy-accuracy trade-off of D-ZOA against an
existing differentially-private ADMM-based algorithm, called
DP-ADMM and proposed in [23]. DP-ADMM is suitable for
learning problems with non-smooth objective functions. It is
a differentially-private algorithm that is not fully-distributed
since it needs a central coordinator to average the dual variable
and the perturbed primal variable over the network at every
iteration. As for the application, we consider a distributed
version of the empirical risk minimization problem defined
by lasso [38].
The network-wide observations are represented by a design
matrix X ∈ RN×P and a response vector y ∈ RN×1 where
N is the number of data samples and P is the number
of features in each sample. The matrix X consists of K
submatricesXk, i.e.,X = [X
T
1 ,X
T
2 , . . . ,X
T
K ]
T, and the vector
y consists of K subvectors yk, i.e., y =
[
yT1 ,y
T
2 , . . . ,y
T
K
]T
,
as the data is distributed among the agents and each agent k
holds its respective Xk ∈ RNk×P and yk ∈ RNk×1 where
N =
∑K
k=1 Nk. The parameter vector that establishes a linear
regression between X and y is β ∈ RP×1. In the centralized
approach, a lasso estimate of β is given by
βc = argmin
β
{‖Xβ − y‖2 + η ‖β‖1}. (33)
In the distributed setting, we solve problem (2) with
Nk∑
j=1
ℓ(xk,j , yk,j ;βk) = ‖Xkβk − yk‖2
R(βk) = ‖βk‖1 .
(34)
We assess the performance of the D-ZOA algorithm over
a network of K = 5 agents with the topology as shown in
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Fig. 2. Normalized error of DP-ADMM and D-ZOA for two values of ǫ and fixed δ.
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Fig. 1. The number of samples at each agent is set to Nk =
20 ∀k ∈ K and the total number of samples is N = 100.
The number of features in each sample is P = 10. For each
agent k ∈ K, we create a 2P × P local observation matrix
Xk whose entries are i.i.d. zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian
random variables. The response vector y is synthesized as
y = Xω +ψ
where ω ∈ RP and ψ ∈ RM are random vectors with
distributions N (0, IP ) and N (0, 0.1IN ), respectively. The
data are preprocessed by normalizing the columns of X to
guarantee that the maximum value of each column is 1 and by
normalizing the rows to enforce their l2-norm to be less than
1 as in [23]. This is motivated by the need for homogeneous
scaling of the features. Therefore, we have c1 = 1. The regu-
larization parameter is set to η = 1 and the penalty parameter
is set to ρ = 4. The number of iterations of the ADMM outer
loop is set to 200. For the inner loop, the number of iterations
is set to 100 and the smoothing constant u1 to 1. To apply
the central limit theorem, J needs to be sufficiently large, i.e.,
J ≥ 30. We set J = 30 and calculate α0 according to (27).
Performance of D-ZOA is evaluated using the normalized error
between the centralized solutions βc as per (33) and the local
estimates. It is defined as
∑K
k=1 ‖βk − βc‖2/‖βc‖2 where βk
denotes the local estimate at agent k. The centralized solution
βc is computed using the convex optimization toolbox CVX
9[39]. Results are obtained by averaging over 100 independent
trials.
In Fig. 2, we plot the normalized error versus the outer
loop iteration index for both D-ZOA and DP-ADMM. The
plots show that both algorithms converge to the centralized
solution for two different values of ǫ and δ. In all plots,
accuracy improves as ǫ increases. This is consistent with
both Theorem 3 and [23, Theorem 3]. The hyper-parameters
in DP-ADMM are tuned to achieve the best accuracy and
convergence rate. The faster convergence of DP-ADMM is
mainly due to its extra centralized processing. However, D-
ZOA has higher accuracy than DP-ADMM.
In Fig. 3, we illustrate the privacy-accuracy trade-off for
both D-ZOA and DP-ADMM. The figures show that D-
ZOA and DP-ADMM achieve higher accuracy with larger
ǫ and δ. In Fig. 3(a), we show the normalized error versus
the privacy parameter ǫ¯ as given in (29) for δ = 10−6
and δ = 10−3. We observe that D-ZOA outperforms DP-
ADMM in terms of accuracy likely due to its intrinsic privacy-
preserving properties. Fig. 3(b) also attests to the superiority
of D-ZOA over DP-ADMM when ǫ = 0.15 and ǫ = 0.95 and
δ varies between 10−6 and 10−2.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed an intrinsically privacy-preserving consensus-
based algorithm for solving a class of distributed regularized
ERM problems where first-order information is hard or even
impossible to obtain. We recast the original problem into an
equivalent constrained optimization problem whose structure
is suitable for distributed implementation via ADMM. We
employed a zeroth-order method, known as the two-point
stochastic-gradient algorithm, to minimize the augmented La-
grangian in the primal update step. We proved that the inherent
randomness due to employing the zeroth-order method makes
the D-ZOA algorithm intrinsically privacy-preserving. In ad-
dition, we used the moments accountant method to show that
the total privacy leakage of D-ZOA grows sublinearly with
the number of ADMM iterations. We verified the convergence
of D-ZOA to the optimal solution as well as studying its
privacy-preserving properties through both theoretical analysis
and numerical simulations.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof. We prove this lemma in two steps. First, we prove that
E[β
(m)
k ] = β˘
(m)
k . Second, we calculate the covariance of β
(m)
k .
We prove that E[β
(m)
k ] = β˘
(m)
k by induction over m.
Base case: Since β
(0)
k = β˘
(0)
k = 0, we have E[β
(0)
k ] = β˘
(0)
k .
Induction step: We assume that E[β
(m−1)
k ] = β˘
(m−1)
k as the
induction hypothesis. Considering (18) and (15), we have
E[β
(m)
k ] = E[β˘
(m)
k ] + E[ξ
(m)
k ]
= β˘
(m)
k + E[ξ
(m)
k ]
= − 1
2ρ|Nk|∇fk(β˘
(m)
k ) +
1
2|Nk|
(
|Nk|β˘(m−1)k
+
∑
l∈Nk
β˘
(m−1)
l
)
− 1
2ρ|Nk|γ
(m−1)
k + E[ξ
(m)
k ]
= − 1
2ρ|Nk|E[∇fk(β˘
(m)
k )]
+
1
2|Nk|
(
|Nk|E[β(m−1)k ] +
∑
l∈Nk
E[β
(m−1)
l ]
)
− 1
2ρ|Nk|E[γ
(m−1)
k ] + E[ξ
(m)
k ]
= E[β
(m)
k ] + E[ξ
(m)
k ],
which implies that E[ξ
(m)
k ] = 0. Therefore, E[β
(m)
k ] = β˘
(m)
k .
Since the sequence {g(t)j,k}Jj=1 is i.i.d. and J is sufficiently
large, thanks to the central limit theorem [40], we have
g
(t)
k =
1
J
J∑
j=1
g
(t)
j,k ∼ N
(
µ
(t)
k ,
1
J
Ψ
(t)
k
)
.
In view of the additive property of the normal distribution and
recalling that β
(m)
k = −
∑T
t=1 αtg
(t)
k , we have
cov[β
(m)
k ] =
1
J
T∑
t=1
α2tΨ
(t)
k . (35)
We also know E[β
(m)
k ] = β˘
(m)
k . Therefore, β
(m)
k is distributed
as
β
(m)
k ∼ N
(
β˘
(m)
k ,
1
J
T∑
t=1
α2tΨ
(t)
k
)
. (36)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof. It is easy to verify that
tr(Ψ
(t)
k ) = tr(E[g
(t)
j,k(g
(t)
j,k)
T]− E[g(t)j,k]E[g(t)j,k]T)
= tr(E[g
(t)
j,k(g
(t)
j,k)
T])−
∥∥∥E[g(t)j,k]∥∥∥2
= E[tr(g
(t)
j,k(g
(t)
j,k)
T)]−
∥∥∥µ(t)k ∥∥∥2
= E
[∥∥∥g(t)j,k∥∥∥2
]
−
∥∥∥µ(t)k ∥∥∥2 .
(37)
By [25, Lemma 2], there exists a constant c such that
E
[∥∥∥g(t)j,k∥∥∥2
]
≤ cL2P
(√u2,t
u1,t
P + 1 + log(P )
)
. (38)
Since u2,t/u1,t = P
−2t−1, we have
E
[∥∥∥g(t)j,k∥∥∥2
]
≤ cL2P
( 1√
t
+ 1 + log(P )
)
. (39)
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In addition, from β
(m)
k = −
∑T
t=1 αtg
(t)
k and (15), we have
β˘
(m)
k = −
T∑
t=1
αtµ
(t)
k . (40)
Taking the Euclidean norm of both sides in (40) and using the
triangle inequality, we have∥∥∥β˘(m)k ∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥∥−
T∑
t=1
αtµ
(t)
k
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
T∑
t=1
|αt|
∥∥∥µ(t)k ∥∥∥ . (41)
Squaring both sides of (41) and using the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, we get∥∥∥β˘(m)k ∥∥∥2 ≤ ( T∑
t=1
|αt|
∥∥∥µ(t)k ∥∥∥)2
≤ T
T∑
t=1
|αt|2
∥∥∥µ(t)k ∥∥∥2
(42)
and consequently
− 1
JP
T∑
t=1
α2t
∥∥∥µ(t)k ∥∥∥2 ≤ − 1TJP
∥∥∥β˘(m)k ∥∥∥2 . (43)
Using (39), (43), and the definition of αt after (11), we have
1
JP
T−1∑
t=1
α2t tr(Ψ
(t)
k )
≤ 1
JP
T−1∑
t=1
α2t cL
2P
( 1√
t
+ 1 + log(P )
)
− 1
JP
T−1∑
t=1
α2t
∥∥∥µ(t)k ∥∥∥2
=
1
JP
cα20R
2
log(2P )
( T∑
t=1
1
t
√
t
+ (1 + log(P ))
T∑
t=1
1
t
)
− 1
TJP
∥∥∥β˘(m)k ∥∥∥2 .
(44)
Defining s1 =
∑T−1
t=1 t
−1 and s2 =
∑T−1
t=1 t
−1.5, (44)
simplifies to
1
JP
T∑
t=1
α2t tr(Ψ
(t)
k )
≤ cα
2
0R
2
JP log(2P )
(
s1(1 + log(P )) + s2
)
−
∥∥∥β˘(m)k ∥∥∥2
TJP
.
(45)
Considering that the algorithm converges as proven in
Section V, i.e., β˘
(m)
k → βc as m → ∞, β˘
(0)
k = 0, and the
triangle inequality, for m > 0 we have∣∣∣∥∥∥β˘(m)k ∥∥∥− ‖βc‖∣∣∣ ≤ ∥∥∥β˘(m)k − βc∥∥∥ ≤ ‖βc‖ , (46)
which implies
∥∥∥β˘(m)k ∥∥∥ ≤ 2 ‖βc‖. Therefore, we obtain
1
JP
T∑
t=1
α2t tr(Ψ
(t)
k )
≤ cα
2
0R
2
JP log(2P )
(
s1(1 + log(P )) + s2
)
− 4 ‖β
c‖2
TJP
.
(47)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof. From the adopted exact primal update equation (18),
we obtain
β˘
(m)
k,Dk =−
0.5
ρ|Nk|
( 1
Nk
Nk∑
j=1
∇ℓ(xk,j , yk,j ; β˘k) + γ(m−1)k
)
+
0.5
|Nk|
(
β˘
(m−1)
k +
∑
l∈Nk
β˘
(m−1)
l +
η∇R(β˘k)
ρK
)
β˘
(m)
k,D′
k
=− 0.5
ρ|Nk|
( 1
Nk
Nk−1∑
j=1
∇ℓ(xk,j , yk,j ; β˘k) + γ(m−1)k
+
1
Nk
∇ℓ(x′k,Nk , y′k,Nk ; β˘k)
)
+
0.5
|Nk|
(
β˘
(m−1)
k +
∑
l∈Nk
β˘
(m−1)
l +
η∇R(β˘k)
ρK
)
.
(48)
Using Assumption 3, the quantity
∥∥∥β˘(m)k,Dk − β˘(m)k,D′k
∥∥∥ is upper
bounded as follows∥∥∥β˘(m)k,Dk − β˘(m)k,D′k
∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∇ℓ(x′k,Nk , y′k,Nk ; β˘k)−∇ℓ(xk,Nk , yk,Nk ; β˘k)
∥∥∥
2ρ|Nk|Nk
≤ c1
ρ|Nk|Nk .
(49)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. The privacy loss due to sharing β
(m)
k is calculated as∣∣∣∣∣∣log
Pr[β
(m)
k,Dk
]
Pr[β
(m)
k,D′
k
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣log
Pr[ξ
(m)
k,Dk
]
Pr[ξ
(m)
k,D′
k
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (50)
where the equality holds since the Jacobian matrix of the
linear transformation from β
(m)
k to ξ
(m)
k is the identity matrix.
Furthermore, as the entries of ξ
(m)
k , denoted by ξ
(m)
s,k , are
independent of each other, for any entry s, we have
∣∣∣∣∣∣log
Pr[ξ
(m)
k,Dk
]
Pr[ξ
(m)
k,D′
k
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣log
Pr[ξ
(m)
s,k,Dk
]
Pr[ξ
(m)
s,k,D′
k
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (51)
Hence, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣log
Pr[β
(m)
k,Dk
]
Pr[β
(m)
k,D′
k
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣log
Pr[ξ
(m)
s,k,Dk
]
Pr[ξ
(m)
s,k,D′
k
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣log
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
k
[ξ
(m)
s,k,Dk
]2
)
exp
(
− 1
2σ2
k
[ξ
(m)
s,k,Dk
+ (β˘
(m)
s,k,Dk
− β˘(m)
s,k,D′
k
)]2
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
(52)
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Via the triangle inequality, (52) leads to∣∣∣∣∣∣log
Pr[β
(m)
k,Dk
]
Pr[β
(m)
k,D′
k
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
1
2σ2k
∣∣∣2ξ(m)s,k (β˘(m)s,k,Dk − β˘(m)s,k,D′k)
∣∣∣
+
1
2σ2k
(β˘
(m)
s,k,Dk
− β˘(m)
s,k,D′
k
)2.
(53)
Since ‖∇ℓ(·)‖ ≤ c1, using Lemma 3, we have∣∣∣β˘(m)s,k,Dk − β˘(m)s,k,D′k
∣∣∣ < ∥∥∥β˘(m)k,Dk − β˘(m)k,D′k
∥∥∥
≤ c1
ρ|Nk|Nk .
(54)
Hence, substituting σk in (25) into (53), we obtain∣∣∣∣∣∣log
Pr[β
(m)
k,Dk
]
Pr[β
(m)
k,D′
k
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
ρ|Nk|Nkǫ2
2.1c1 log(1.25/δ)
∣∣∣∣ξ(m)s,k + c12ρ|Nk|Nk
∣∣∣∣ .
(55)
When
|ξ(m)s,k | ≤
c1
ρ|Nk|Nk
(
2.1ǫ−1 log(1.25/δ)− 0.5) ,
the privacy loss is bounded by ǫ. Hence, let us define
r =
c1
ρ|Nk|Nk
(
2.1ǫ−1 log(1.25/δ)− 0.5) .
Subsequently, we need to prove that
Pr[|ξ(m)s,k | > r] ≤ δ
or equivalently
Pr[ξ
(m)
s,k > r] ≤ 0.5δ.
Using the tail bound of the normal distribution N (0, σ2k) [34],
we obtain
Pr[ξ
(m)
s,k > r] ≤
σk
r
√
2π
exp
(
− r
2
2σ2k
)
. (56)
Since δ is assumed to be small (≤ 0.01) and ǫ ≤ 1, we have
σk
r
< 1 and − r
2
2σ2k
< log(0.5
√
2πδ).
Therefore,
Pr[ξ
(m)
s,k > r] < 0.5δ,
which implies
Pr[|ξ(m)s,k | > r] ≤ δ.
By defining
A1 = {ξ(m)s,k : |ξ(m)s,k | ≤ r}
A2 = {ξ(m)s,k : |ξ(m)s,k | > r},
we have
Pr[β
(m)
k,Dk
] = Pr[β˘
(m)
s,k,Dk
+ ξ
(m)
s,k : ξ
(m)
s,k ∈ A1]
+ Pr[β˘
(m)
s,k,Dk
+ ξ
(m)
s,k : ξ
(m)
s,k ∈ A2]
< eǫPr[β
(m)
k,D′
k
] + δ,
(57)
which concludes the proof by showing that, at each iteration
of D-ZOA, (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy is guaranteed.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof. Using the first-order condition for convexity [30], we
have
f(w˘(m))− f(w∗) ≤ (w˘(m) −w∗)T∇f(w˘(m)). (58)
In addition, in virtue of [36, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2], w˘(m)
satisfies the following equation
∇f(w˘(m))
ρ
= 2Hξ(m) − 2Qr(m) − L+(w(m) −w(m−1)).
(59)
Therefore, by using (58), (59), [36, Lemma 3, Lemma 4 and
Lemma 5], and the steps in the proof of [37, Theorem 1], we
can show that, for any r ∈ RKP and m > 0, we have
f(w˘(m))− f(w∗)
ρ
+ 2rTQw˘(m)
≤(w˘(m) −w∗)T
(
−L+(w˘(m) − w˘(m−1))
− L+(w˘(m−1) −w(m−1))− 2Q(r(m) − r)
+L−(w
(m) − w˘(m))
)
=
∥∥q(m−1) − q∥∥2
G
ρ
−
∥∥q(m) − q∥∥2
G
ρ
−
∥∥q(m) − q(m−1)∥∥2
G
ρ
+ (w˘(m) −w∗)TL+(w(m−1) − w˘(m−1))
+ (w˘(m) −w∗)TL−(w(m) − w˘(m)) + 2(ξ(m))TQ(r(m) − r)
=
∥∥q(m−1) − q∥∥2
G
ρ
−
∥∥q(m) − q∥∥2
G
ρ
−
∥∥∥Qw˘(m)∥∥∥2 − ∥∥∥Qξ(m)∥∥∥2 + 2(ξ(m))TQ(r(m) − r)
+ 2
(L+
2
(w˘(m) −w∗)
)T
(w(m−1) − w˘(m−1))
(60)
where q = [rT, (w∗)T]T.
For any symmetric matrix X ∈ RP×P and vector y ∈ RP ,
we have
‖y‖2 λmin(X) ≤ yTXy ≤ ‖y‖2 λmax(X)
and, for any a,b ∈ RP and τ ∈ R+, we have
2aTb ≤ τ−1 ‖a‖2 + τ ‖b‖2 .
Therefore, (60) yields
f(w˘(m))− f(w∗)
ρ
+ 2rTQw˘(m)
≤
∥∥q(m−1) − q∥∥2
G
ρ
−
∥∥q(m) − q∥∥2
G
ρ
−
∥∥∥Qξ(m)∥∥∥2
− λmin(L−)
2
∥∥∥w˘(m) −w∗∥∥∥2 + 1
τ
∥∥∥∥L+2 (w˘(m) −w∗)
∥∥∥∥
2
+ τ
∥∥∥w(m−1) − w˘(m−1)∥∥∥2 + 2(ξ(m))TQ(r(m) − r).
(61)
By setting
τ =
λ2max(L+)
2λmin(L−)
,
12
(61) leads to
f(w˘(m))− f(w∗)
ρ
+ 2rTQw˘(m)
≤
∥∥q(m−1) − q∥∥2
G
ρ
−
∥∥q(m) − q∥∥2
G
ρ
−
∥∥∥Qξ(m)∥∥∥2
+
λ2max(L+)
2λmin(L−)
∥∥∥w(m−1) − w˘(m−1)∥∥∥2
+ 2(ξ(m))TQ(r(m) − r)
≤
∥∥q(m−1) − q∥∥2
G
ρ
−
∥∥q(m) − q∥∥2
G
ρ
+
λ2max(L+)
2λmin(L−)
∥∥∥ξ(m−1)∥∥∥2 + 2(ξ(m))TQ(r(m) − r).
(62)
Setting r = 0P and summing both sides of (62) overm = 1
to M gives
1
ρ
M∑
m=1
(f(w˘(m))− f(w∗)) ≤ 1
ρ
∥∥∥q(0) − q∥∥∥2
G
+
M∑
m=1
λ2max(L+)
2λmin(L−)
∥∥∥ξ(m−1)∥∥∥2 + 2(ξ(m))TQr(m).
(63)
Using Jensen’s inequality [40], (22), (25), and applying the
expectation operator to both sides of (63), we obtain
E[f(wˆ(M))− f(w∗)]
≤ 1
M
∥∥∥q(0) − q∥∥∥2
G
+
ρλ2max(L+)
2Mλmin(L−)
M∑
m=1
E
[∥∥∥ξ(m−1)∥∥∥2]
≤
∥∥q(0) − q∥∥2
G
M
+
ρλ2max(L+)
∑M
m=1 tr
(
cov[ξ(m−1)]
)
2Mλmin(L−)
≤
∥∥q(0) − q∥∥2
G
M
+
ρλ2max(L+)
2Mλmin(L−)
M∑
m=1
Pσ2k
=
∥∥q(0) − q∥∥2
G
M
+
2.1c21Pρ log(1.25/δ)λ
2
max(L+)
2ρ2|Nk|2N2k ǫ2λmin(L−)
(64)
where
wˆ(M) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
w˘(m).
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